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‘Battle Groups’ to strengthen EU military crisis management?
he Franco-British duo has 
once more stepped up a 
gear on European defence with 
a new concept for rapid 
deployment ‘battle groups’. The 
concept is at the heart of a 
renewed impetus to implement 
the defence aspects of Solana’s 
EU Security Strategy, which 
includes a new Headline Goal 
(HG 2004-2010) being adopted 
at the European Council in June 
2004. It thus forms an important
link between the previous 
‘quantitative’ approach to 
improving European defence 
capabilities and the new 
‘qualitative’ emphasis of the 
Headline Goal 2010.
The Process
The idea of developing such a
concept was floated at the
Franco-British summit at Le
Touquet (4 February 2003) and
was made more explicit in the
24 November meeting, in
London. At that meeting the two 
countries referred to the need for 
joint tactical groups – of about 
1,500 soldiers each – to be
created so as to strengthen the
EU rapid reaction capability to
support United Nations’
operations. The experience of
Operation Artemis in
Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) – the first EU-led
military operation launched in
June 2003 at the request of the
UN Security Council – is a
typical scenario for which the
battle groups may be deployed. 
The Franco-British proposal -
referred to as ‘Battle Groups’ by 
the British or ‘Tactical Groups’ by the French - was 
endorsed by Germany in February 2004, and, on
February 10, was submitted to the Political and
Security Committee, which, in turn, asked for a
Military Committee’s opinion on the technical aspects 
of the concept (February 18).  It subsequently gained 
further support at the Brussels informal defence
ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting, on 5/6 
April. A target date of 2007 was set for achieving the 
first operational Battle Groups (expectations range
from 6 to 10), although the EU could have two or three 
of them available much sooner based on existing
capabilities and voluntary contributions under the
Headline Goal Force Catalogue. It is expected that the 
formal endorsement of the Franco-British-German
concept will occur at the 17-18 May Joint Foreign
Affairs and Defence Ministers’ Council and then form 
part of the new Headline Goal 2010, to be adopted at 
the June 2004 European Council.
In principle, the battle group proposal is open to all EU 
member states, although France and Britain stressed
that a high degree of interoperability in terms of
training, equipment, command and planning is
required. It would therefore be one way in which the 
bar is set for the soon 25 member states to join in the 
newly emerging European defence club, by setting
criteria for structured co-operation.
The Battle Group Concept
The trilateral proposal for EU battle groups consists of 
highly trained, battalion-size formations (1,500
soldiers each)
1
– including all combat and service
support as well as deployability and sustainability
assets. These should be available within 15 days notice 
and sustainable for at least 30 days (extendable to 120 
days by rotation). They should be flexible enough to
promptly undertake operations in distant crises areas 
(i.e. failing states), under, but not exclusively, a UN
mandate, and to conduct combat missions in an
extremely hostile environment (mountains, desert,
jungle, etc). As such, they should prepare the ground 
for larger, more traditional peacekeeping forces,
ideally provided by the UN or the Member States.
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Not surprisingly, the development of the battle group
concept implies the availability of strategic lift and
combat support capabilities. In this respect, the
concept is linked to the Helsinki Headline Goal
process and its ambitions to make up key identified
capability shortfalls. 
Building on the original Helsinki Headline Goal 
(HHG)
The original Helsinki Headline Goal (1999) was a
‘start up’ process for ESDP capability development,
setting out quantitative targets for military capability
for 1999-2003. It aimed to develop an EU rapid
reaction force consisting of 60,000 troops available at 
60 days notice and sustainable for up to one year. The 
HHG process led to a review of the available
capabilities (documented in three catalogues: the
Headline Goal Catalogue, the Headline Force
Catalogue and the Headline Progress Catalogue) which
helped identify remaining shortfalls, particularly in the
key areas of strategic lift and sustainability.
A key feature of the original HHG was the ‘voluntary’ 
nature of member states’ commitments. This led to the 
cataloguing, This led to the cataloguing process, which 
helped identify the remaining shortfalls. But this
process was limited in so far as the catalogues provide 
no guarantees regarding what assets, troops and
resources are actually available or really operational.
Furthermore, most analysts agree that the defence
capability generation process (specifically under the
European Capabilities Action Plan - ECAP) slowed
down in late 2002/2003 and had not prevented the
considerable waste of resources spent on inefficient
generation of military capacity throughout Europe
(amounting to 160 million Euro)
2
.
Although the Helsinki Headline Goals were declared
formally met in 2003, the Thessaloniki European
Council, in June 2003, acknowledged that the EU
operational capability across the full range of
Petersberg tasks was still limited and constrained by
recognised shortfalls. In December 2003, the EU
Security Strategy prompted the institutions to revisit 
the original Headline Goal and capability generation
process. The November 17 GAERC conclusions
confirmed that the Petersberg Tasks would be revisited 
and ‘defined’ by the June 2004 European Council,
under a new Headline Goal to be met by 2010. Beyond 
the continued efforts to make up key capability
shortfalls, the new HG 2010 will focus on the need for 
qualitative improvements to put existing EU defence
capabilities at the service of the whole range of crisis 
management operations, included in the revised
Petersberg tasks
3
.
Implementing the defence aspects of the EU
Security Strategy
If France, Britain and Germany manage to build
consensus around their proposal, and if the Headline
Goal 2010 is adopted by the end of the Irish
Presidency, the battle group concept could be
developed in the second half of this year.  A
commitments conference will be convened in order to 
make the concept real and fully operational by 2007, 
although a limited capability based on existing
formations in the UK, Italy and France, for example,
could be made available earlier. 
Will it deliver new capabilities?
Crucially, the Battle Group concept is not just about 
re-arranging existing capabilities but is rather a tool to 
produce new ones. A key benchmark for measuring the 
value of the concept will be in seeing which countries 
offer to provide or create new Battle Groups at the
commitments conference likely to be held this autumn. 
The EU Military Staff (EUMS) will also need to
develop the concept through realistic scenario-based
work to promote readiness, sustainability, concurrency 
and follow-on forces, as well as co-operation with and 
transition to civilian operations. It remains to be seen, 
however, if this work takes place within the EU
Military Staff, in the new planning cell for civilian and 
military operations, or as part of the
Armaments/Capabilities Agency’s remit. The civil-
military planning cell provides the obvious location for 
discussions relating to how Battle Groups might be
deployed in complex conflicts and peacebuilding
processes. There is little evidence, however, that the
proposed cell will be robust enough to bridge the
crucial ‘security gap’ known as the ‘civil-military
divide’ and ensure an integrated and comprehensive
approach to the planning of military and civilian EU
interventions.
Gerrard Quille
1. A battle group is the smallest self-sufficient military-
operational formation that can be deployed and 
sustained in a theatre of operations. The concept draws 
upon standard NATO doctrine, for instance the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) ‘land component’ is a land 
brigade tactically configured with 5 Battle Groups.
2. See Jocelyn Mawdsley and Gerrard Quille, “The EU 
Security Strategy: a new framework for ESDP and 
equipping the EU Rapid Reaction Force”, joint ISIS-
BICC Report, December 2003. Available on 
http://www.isiseurope.org/ftp/download/reportdefence.p
df
3. The Petersberg tasks were also revised in the context of 
the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference 
negotiations, yet to be concluded.
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Building a European intelligence community in response to terrorism
The European Union has not been passive in its fight 
against terrorism, but progress in implementing 
decisions taken by the Council of Ministers has been 
slow and piecemeal. At first glance, the terrorist
bombings in Madrid on 11 March seem to have 
changed this. The declaration on combating terrorism 
from 25 March 2004 and the establishment of a 
counter-terrorism coordinator give the impression that 
the Union's work in the fight against terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
organised crime is entering a new era. Sharing 
intelligence and strengthening the cooperation 
between national intelligence agencies and European 
bodies plays an important part in this. The significance 
of intelligence has also been highlighted by the
Austrian proposal to set up a ‘European intelligence 
agency’. This article outlines the present state of 
intelligence collaboration within the EU as well as the 
most recent developments in the sector.
What is intelligence?
In the broadest sense, intelligence can be understood as 
processed information aimed at assisting decision-
making. Since different types of decisions require
different forms of support, member states have set up 
various types of organisations responsible for
providing the necessary information. Those
organisations involved in collecting information in
secrecy or analysing secret information are normally
labelled intelligence agencies. Most of them can be
categorised according to their function, e.g. military, 
security, criminal or external intelligence agencies, or
with reference to their method of collection, e.g.
imagery or signal intelligence agencies. 
European co-operation in criminal intelligence
In the third pillar, which deals with Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA), the EU has sought to facilitate cross-
border cooperation among national agencies in order to 
improve the support given to national decision-makers.
With Europol, the Union created a clearing house for 
the exchange of criminal intelligence - this is its only
body for sharing operational intelligence. The purpose
of Europol and its approximately 65 criminal analysts 
is to support the criminal investigations conducted by
national authorities and to establish links between
serious crimes in different Member States. It does so
by providing expertise, an analysis capacity and
information from its databases. It also brings together 
around 70 seconded officers from national authorities. 
They co-operate in temporary task forces within
Europol or on one of its 23 more permanent analytical 
work-files. The latter cover a range of areas from child 
pornography, vehicle theft and one work-file is
devoted to Islamic terrorism. In response to the Madrid 
bombings the Council decided to reactivate the closed
counter-terrorist task force within Europol. The aim is 
to facilitate the direct exchange of information
between national representatives in order to get a more 
complete picture of the criminal activities of terrorist 
groups. The task force will of course also be able to 
draw on findings from Europol’s work-file on Islamic 
terrorism. To be of value for national investigations, 
the information exchanged is very detailed and can
concern specific individuals, number plates of cars and 
phone numbers.
Co-operation in support of European external
security policy
The EU has also established bodies within the Council 
Secretariat that are responsible for providing EU
decision-makers working on Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) in the second pillar with
relevant information. Apart from open sources, these
entities draw on information from the member states 
and the EU itself (most notably the Commission) or 
from commercial providers as in the case of the EU
Satellite Centre (SATCEN).
SATCEN has taken over this function from the WEU 
and represents the first truly European intelligence
capacity, in the sense that it provides the EU with a 
competency that does not exist in all member states. 
The importance of the centre and its 30 or so imagery 
analysts for the Union's policies should not, however, 
be exaggerated. SATCEN is neither the only provider 
of imagery intelligence from satellites nor does it own 
or operate any collection resources.
The intelligence division (INTDIV) of the European
military staff consists of about 30 seconded officers 
from national intelligence agencies. They compile
reports, based on national intelligence, to support the
strategic planning that starts as soon as a crisis
emerges and ends when the EU political authorities
approve a military strategic option or a set of military 
strategic options. Consequently, the intelligence
products of the INTDIV are of a strategic nature and 
less detailed than tactical military intelligence. The
latter kind of support is provided from national
agencies directly to the operational line of command
and partly produced by the responsible force on the
ground itself.
The expansion of the Joint Situation Centre’s (SitCen) 
capacity, to include a counter-terrorism unit (CT Unit), 
is the only new development concerning intelligence
cooperation in the second pillar since the Madrid
bombings. The SitCen’s current analysis capacity
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consists of seven seconded national experts and this is 
likely to be doubled by the establishment of the CT 
Unit. The SitCen provides tailored situation and threat 
assessments, based on national intelligence, open
sources, diplomatic reports from member states and
the Commission's representations. The CT Unit will
complement this by making threat assessments
specifically relating to terrorism. The products from 
the SitCen primarily support the work of the Secretary 
General/High Representative of CFSP, Javier Solana, 
and the national Ambassadors that comprise the
Political and Security Committee, the Union’s
principal decision-making body in the area of
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These 
EU policies are essentially of diplomatic and
preventive nature. They do not include strikes against 
identified terrorists, proliferators or criminals on
territory that falls under the authority of third states, or 
assaults on vessels in international waters, nor do they 
comprise clandestine operations. Any such operations
are executed by Member States independently. SitCen
products are, therefore, of a strategic rather than
operational nature. To what extent the Union’s newly
appointed counter-terrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries 
(former member of the European Parliament, national 
representative in the European Convention and former 
secretary of state at the Dutch ministry of interior) will
be involved in the CT Unit’s work has not yet been
clarified.
Is this enough?
Despite the political will to promote common action
against terrorism, several difficulties remain
concerning intelligence co-operation within the EU. 
To begin with, there are a number of structural
obstacles. The pillar division between work in the area 
of Justice and Home Affairs and in support of
CFSP/ESDP effectively disconnects EU external and
internal intelligence. A synthesis is not made at the EU 
level. Consequently, the structure of analysis is not
adapted to the nature of the terrorist threat, which
erases the border between internal and external threats.
A gap also exists concerning the inclusion of security
intelligence into the EU system. This means that ‘MI5-
type’ intelligence is not shared at the Union level. The 
Austrian proposal to set up such a ‘European
intelligence agency’ addressed this gap but was
comprehensively rejected by the Council on 19
February 2004, mainly because member states
considered it far too ambitious. Nevertheless, the
creation of the CT Unit could be seen as a first step in 
this direction. Initially, however, it will focus on third 
countries and not the EU territory, since this falls
within the national competencies. The exchange
between security services will therefore continue
outside of the Union through the so-called ‘Club of 
Bern’ in the foreseeable future, following the motto 'do 
not fix it unless it is broken'. This might satisfy the
need of cross-border co-operation, but not the need of 
enhanced cross-agency co-operation between different 
branches.
A further obstacle to intelligence co-operation is that 
national intelligence communities are structured in
different ways and agencies do not always have a
counterpart in another state. It is therefore not always 
easy to determine what agencies should collaborate
and what EU agency it should be linked to. Co-
operation is made even more complicated by rivalries 
among some national agencies. 
Arguably the most important brake on intelligence co-
operation is the fact that this requires trust, built up
over time. Just as the collection of intelligence in the 
field by agents and informers is based on building
confidence with their sources (human intelligence),
exchanging intelligence products between different
European Agencies equally requires the gradual
development of trusting relationships. One way to
expedite this process would be to organise more
collective education. Several practitioners regard this
to be the best way of ensuring that staff from various 
agencies get to know and trust each other. This
potential is far from being exhausted at the European 
level. A much more difficult, but equally important
step forward would be a collective statement by all
member states that they will refrain from spying on
each other and braking laws in other member states to 
collect information on third parties. While member
states preserve the right to spy on each other, it is 
difficult to envisage how they can also generate the
requisite levels of trust for effective intelligence co-
operation.
Björn Müller-Wille
The Dublin Conflict Prevention Action Agenda
Over 250 representatives from Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) met in Dublin for a West 
European Regional Conference on conflict prevention 
from March 31 – April 2. This conference – one of 
fifteen to be held globally – was organised by the 
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed 
Conflict (GPPAC) and supported by the EU Irish 
Presidency. The conference successfully enabled the 
further development of the Dublin Action Agenda (see 
http://www.xs4all.nl/~conflic1/Dublin/cover.htm), with
recommendations for how civil society organisations 
(CSOs) could better work together, with governments 
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and with the EU and UN in the pursuit of conflict 
prevention objectives. The Dublin Action agenda4 will
also inform the broader International Action Agenda 
for civil society roles in conflict prevention, to be 
presented to the UN Secretary General in July 2005 in 
New York.
The UN High Level Panel on Global Security
The Dublin conference on the role of civil society and 
conflict prevention took place six months after UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan announced, on 23
September 2003, the formation of a high level panel on 
global security threats and reform of the international 
system. One of the main purposes of the Dublin Action 
Agenda is to feed into the UN high-level panel
recommendations.
Creating a stronger fusion between the UN and CSOs 
on conflict prevention related matters also readily fits 
with the findings of the UN Secretary General’s Panel 
of Eminent Persons on Civil Society. These findings
favour a new understanding of multilateralism within
the UN system, which seeks to complement inter -state
negotiations (yielding to lowest common denominator 
outcomes) with aspirational coalitions of the willing
involving state and non-state actors, e.g. the coalition 
to ban landmines.
The Dublin Action Agenda – Ethos and Principles
The provisional Dublin Action Agenda was codified
and handed over to the Irish Presidency of the EU on 2 
April. The Agenda not only forwards practical
recommendations for the CSOs, the EU, the UN and 
individual governments, but also outlines guiding
principles in order to effectively pursue conflict
prevention.
5
 For example, the theme of human security 
is prevalent. It is argued that broader definitions of
security are required, while national and international
actors require a more fluid early response capability in
order to react to conflict as soon as conflict indicators 
register on the radar screen. In pursuing a stronger
conflict prevention focus, the Agenda points to the
responsibility to prevent and protect in line with the
conclusions of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, which supports
intervention in the interest of human security.
6
Additionally, the role of education and the promotion
of a Culture of Peace are highlighted in the Agenda. 
The promotion of local ownership and a new strategic 
partnership between civil society, government and
IGOs
7
 is advocated as necessary in the pursuit of a
conflict prevention approach. The Agenda also notes 
the campaign on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 
on Women, Peace and Security.
Recommendations for CSOs, EU, UN and 
governments
In accordance with these principles, the Dublin Action 
Agenda puts forward practical recommendations,
which apply to CSOs, the EU, UN and governments 
respectively.
Civil Society Organisations
Specifically the need for CSO networking and
coalition building in order to facilitate inter-agency co-
ordination, joint initiatives and the exchange of
experiences is advocated in the Agenda. It is
recommended that Civil Peace Services be developed 
in member states with responsibilities for the
recruitment, training and deployment of expert
civilians for conflict prevention operations. It is also
recommended that a public awareness campaign
should be orchestrated to focus on the July 2005 UN 
conference.
The EU
The Dublin Action Agenda also forwards
recommendations to the EU on how to mainstream 
CSO participation in EU activities, so as to engender a 
conflict prevention focus. In doing so, the appointment 
of CSO co-ordinators in EC delegations is
recommended. In addition to the need to focus on early 
warning and early action mechanisms – through the
development of civilian capabilities with CSO support 
- the EU should ensure local CSO partnership in
assessing the impact or potential impact of EU
interventions on the ground. The Agenda also
recommends the need for EU consultation and
programmes with CSOs in tackling weapons
proliferation and the benefit of utilising civil society as
an alternative entry point in states and regions in crisis. 
At the EU institutional level, the Agenda calls for
promotion of formal civil society engagement in
political and civilian crisis management dialogue –
notable in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
and CIVCOM. 
The UN
The Agenda also sets out recommendations on how 
CSOs could better interact with the UN, with the aim 
of furthering the conflict prevention agenda. These
recommendations equally range from early warning
and early response mechanisms to the need for an
interface between the UN and CSOs. On a practical 
level, the Agenda calls for UN staff training on early 
warning indicators to be made more available to CSOs. 
Also on the operational side, the Agenda notes the
benefit of creating and training specialist teams for
rapid conflict response, which should include CSO and 
academic experts. At an institutional level, greater
CSO and UNDP consultation regarding post-conflict
needs assessments is called for. 
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Governments
The recommendations to governments are based
largely upon the need to prioritise the conflict
prevention agenda. The recommendations include the
development of national conflict prevention
mechanisms (with CSO influence), strategic CSO
interaction with donor governments and greater
resource mobilisation for conflict prevention activities
at national level.
Engaging political support 
The Dublin conference demonstrated the EU Irish
Presidency’s focus on conflict prevention and
symbolically took place at the same time as a meeting
in Dublin between the EU and the African Union on
the theme of conflict resolution and prevention.
However, the lack of formal communication between
conference participants and the EU’s committee on
crisis management - CIVCOM – (which held a parallel 
meeting in Dublin also on the theme of conflict
prevention at the same time as the conference) can be 
considered a missed opportunity for both CSOs and
CIVCOM. Also, apart from the European
Commission, there was a marked absence of other
donors and conflict prevention actors, including
governmental donor agencies - who in effect often set 
the conflict prevention agenda - and other inter-
governmental and regional actors, most notably the
Council of Europe and OSCE. 
What remains now to be seen is whether governments,
the EU and the UN buy-in to the Dublin Action
Agenda, as part of a broader commitment to promoting 
human security.  The reality is that long-term
approaches to conflict prevention are still relatively
sidelined in the EU and elsewhere, in comparison with 
the priority given to short-term (often military) crisis 
management responses. As one speaker suggested at 
the conference, ‘talking to politicians about conflict
prevention is like talking to teenagers about pensions.’
Thus, the greatest challenge identified for CSOs is to 
effectively engage with governments to adopt longer-
term horizons in line with the principles of conflict 
prevention clearly stated in the Dublin Action Agenda.
In order to advocate this approach successfully, CSOs 
must show governments, regional and international
organisation the benefits of preventive measures,
rather than always resorting to crisis measures after the 
outbreak of conflict. Implementation of the Dublin
Action Agenda would certainly be a good first step in 
making this happen, but ultimately a cognitive change 
of the political agenda is required. The dawning of
such a new agenda, however, requires political will in 
support of long-term human security approaches rather 
than short-term responses to perceived threats. 
Rory Keane
1. The Dublin Action Agenda is being coordinated by the 
European Centre for Conflict Prevention, in its 
chairmanship role of the GPPAC.  See www.conflict-
prevention.org  (ECCP).
2. The provisional Dublin Action Agenda decouples any 
notion of linkage between the war on terror and conflict 
prevention by making the point that strategies deployed 
in the ‘War Against Terror’ are likely to prove counter-
productive and, therefore, ultimately risk being self-
defeating.
3.  ‘Responsibility to Protect’, International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian 
Government, para 8.33. Found at: http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report2-en.asp#foreword
4. This new partnership will serve to affirm and build on 
the principle identified in UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan’s Report on ‘The Prevention of Armed Conflict’,
where he recognised that conflict prevention cannot 
happen without civil society involvement.
The Commission moves into defence research
After many years of bitter complaint from defence 
industry about a lack of progress at the EU level on 
the funding of defence and security research, inaction 
has recently turned to purposeful activity. While the
Agency in the field of Armaments, Research and 
Military Capabilities was meant to cover activity in 
defence related research, it seems that in a major 
departure from established practice the Commission 
intends to snatch this responsibility for itself thus 
bringing defence into the first pillar. Recent
communiqués, a Group of Personalities Report 
commissioned by the Commission, a pilot funding 
action and budgetary planning document, all indicate 
that the Commission is breaking new ground and 
moving into the business of funding defence research. 
This article documents this trend and questions the 
legal grounds, procedural legitimacy and effectiveness 
of these actions.
The Trend
The Commission’s efforts to take over defence-related
research have a long history. While the Framework
Programmes for research have never been allowed to 
fund defence-related research, increasingly over the
years, dual use research has been funded. Of late
however the pace has quickened, especially following 
the Council decision to set up the Agency. Following a 
number of communiqués in cognate areas such as
defence equipment
1
and aerospace industry
2
 which
claimed that the Commission should play a role in
defence research, the Commission issued a
communiqué in March on security research3 and a
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decision on implementing a preparatory action
4
and on 
15 March the Group of Personalities for Security
Research (GoP), set up by the Commission, presented 
its report to Romano Prodi
5.
  These actions have
involved the use of much ambiguous language to
disguise the defence-related nature of their contents
such as the use of the new term security research. 
Subsequently, the Commission published the first call 
for proposals for projects and supporting activities
under the new ‘Preparatory Action on the enhancement 
of the European industrial potential in the field of
Security Research’ (PASR 2004) on 31 March. This 
action expects to spend 65 million euros over three
years and would serve as a pilot phase for the
Commission’s broader agenda of establishing a
separate security research programme to facilitate a
EU security culture. This would be in addition to the
dual-use research already funded under the existing
Framework Programmes for research and to any
research activity carried out by the new Agency in the 
field of Armaments, Research and Military
Capabilities. However, it appears to duplicate parts of 
both mandates. The Preparatory Action will fund
projects in the following priority mission areas:
• Improving situation awareness
• Optimising security and protection of
networked systems
• Protecting against terrorism
• Enhancing crisis management
• Achieving interoperability and integrated
systems for information and communication.
There was some surprise that these priorities do not 
map the agreed priorities on anti-terrorist activity
given that this was meant to be the Commission’s key
role but instead seemed more linked to security policy.
In the communiqué on security research the
Commission also draws heavily on the EU Security
Strategy for its inspiration rather than its Justice and
Home Affairs portfolio (by which it might more
reasonably have been expected to be guided given its 
importance for its supposed role in security) but
otherwise it merely further elaborates on the plans for 
the preparatory action. As in the preparatory action
documentation, there is a failure to define what exactly 
the Commission thinks security research is. The
Commission’s uses a somewhat unusual definition of
security culture in its communiqué - “Europe needs to 
invest in a 'security culture' that harnesses the
combined and relatively untapped strengths of the
'security' industry and the research community in order 
to effectively and innovatively address existing and
future security challenges.” Finally in the Group of
Personalities Report on Security Research, established
by the Commission to advise it, there are clear signs 
that the Commission is planning to expand its
activities into defence research. It contends that there 
should be no division between civilian and military
security research but suggests that 1 billion euro per 
year should be spent on security research in addition to 
any activity carried out by the Agency and existing
dual-use research programmes.
Legal Grounds
The Commission has a legitimate role in promoting
civilian security research, but its mandate for
involvement in defence research is extremely
controversial and has frequently been opposed in the
past by some member states and groups in the
European Parliament. There are therefore some
questions about the constitutionality of the
Commission’s actions regarding both their mandate
and source of funding. Firstly, although the
Commission’s website suggests that the Thessaloniki
presidency conclusions asked them to embark on a
security research programme, in fact these conclusions 
asked the Agency to promote ‘in liaison with the
Community's research activities where appropriate,
research aimed at leadership in strategic technologies 
for future defense and security capabilities’. This
would continue the current division of responsibilities 
with the Member States retaining power over defence-
related matters. The Commission also claims
legitimacy from the results of opinion polls that show 
the European citizens support ESDP. But the question 
of Commission funding for defence research has never 
been put to the public. Secondly, it appears that the 
funding approved for the Preparatory Action in 2004
has been provided under Article 157 of the EC Treaty 
(Title XVI -Industry) rather than under Title XVIII 
(Research) as ordered in Article 163(3) of the Treaty6.
The British House of Commons European Scrutiny
Committee has already raised these questions, asking 
British ministers to clarify matters with the
Commission
7
.
Procedural Concerns 
Regardless of the legality of their actions, the
Commission does not appear to be approaching this 
new field in an open and transparent manner. The
Group of Personalities it asked to produce a report on 
security research, for example, would hardly measure 
well against the Commission’s own good governance 
yardstick. Firstly, the Group’s composition is strange. 
There are notable absentees; the Justice and Home
Affairs Commissioner Vitorino was not included
(strange given his responsibility on anti-terrorism and 
border control); no member from the European Group 
on Ethics (odd given the major civil liberties
implications of the research proposed); no co-option of 
a member of the Agency Establishment Team; and
poor representation (only Eurocontrol) of users of
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civilian security research like Europol or national
security agencies. Instead representatives from NATO,
the WEAO, OCCAR, Belgian and Greek defence
ministry officials, defence research institutes and a
large defence industry contingent were chosen
reflecting a strong bias towards military rather than
civilian research. Secondly, the Report is strange in
that it appears to be presenting an industry wish list 
rather than impartial expert advice. Unsurprisingly, it
contends that there should be no division between
military and civilian research and argues for a huge 1
billion euros per year (minimum) to be spent on
security research thus helping to meet the Lisbon
target of 3% of GDP spent on research. Its primary
claim for doing this appears to be that as the US has 
chosen to invest this much in Homeland Security so
must the EU, to ensure that US industry does not have 
a competitive advantage.
The European Commission appears to be relying
heavily in its efforts to acquire a role in defence policy 
for advice and to legitimise its actions on groups of
experts, whose balance is not always evident. The
NGO Statewatch has heavily criticised the
Commission for the lack of accountability in this
procedure
8
 and underlined the necessity for the
Commission not to merely reproduce the
recommendations of such groups in its communiqués. 
Indeed of late, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
see a clear division between these types of documents. 
The Star 21 Report on aerospace industry
9
 and the
communiqué responding to it provide a perfect
example of the problem and this practice is worrying
from a good governance perspective. It is to be hoped 
that the European Parliament will be scrutinising such 
developments fully in its annual report on arms exports 
and the defence industry.
Is this likely to produce effective action?
The Commission appears throughout the
documentation to be extremely keen to justify its
actions, but this is leading it to make a problematic
conflation of issues. If the security threat is so great 
that a huge extra Homeland Security research
programme is needed as in America (although many
European commentators have been arguing that the
American reaction is excessive), then surely this
should be an applied research programme and
therefore the (predominantly civilian) users rather than 
the producers of such research should be advising on 
this. Equally, technology cannot solve all security
problems and its use must be balanced by respect for 
civil liberties. The ELISE research network is correct 
to call for the Commission to take a more balanced 
approach
10
. If on the other hand, as the recent
communiqués and reports seem to suggest, the
Commission’s primary aim is to ensure technological 
and industrial competitiveness for defence industry in
the global market, then they should be openly making 
a cogently argued economic and scientific case for
special subsidy of this specific sector, which engages 
with the considerable economic arguments against
such a move. The issue of EU commitments in the 
fields of arms control and non-proliferation needs to be 
considered as well. The need to deal with new security 
challenges and the economic competitiveness of
defence industry are not the same and it is misleading 
to conflate them as the Commission is currently doing. 
Furthermore, the constitutional significance of a
Commission move into defence activity should not be 
under-estimated, and as such should not happen by the 
backdoor without debate.
Jocelyn Mawdsley
1. COM 2003 113 final
2. COM 2003 600 final
3. COM (2004) 72 final
4. Decision 2004/213/EC
5. http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/security/pdf/gop_en.
pdf
6. The proposed financial framework for 2007-2013 (COM 
2004 (101) final) seems to suggest that it places a 
proposed 3 billion euros to be spent on security research 
in the research budget but this is not clear. It is also not 
clear whether this figure will be revised following the 
GoP report.
7. House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee 12th
Report of the 2003-4 Parliamentary Session.
8. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/feb/23Aeu-plan-
security.htm
9. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/aerospace/rep
ort_star21_screen.pdf
10. http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=319&
ESR News In Brief
Interim Report on EU Strategic Partnership with 
Mediterranean and the Middle East
At the 26 March European Council, the Irish
Presidency delivered an Interim Report on the EU
Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the
Middle East countries. This followed the request made 
by the December 2003 European Council to the
Presidency and the SG/HR to elaborate, in co-
ordination with the Commission, concrete proposals on 
a strategy towards this region. The Strategic
Partnership should be finalised by the June 2004
European Council.
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The report stresses the need for the EU to raise its
engagement in the region, by working in partnership
with the states concerned to support internally driven
economic, political and social reforms. The aim of the 
strategy is to develop a set of guiding principle and
objectives for its engagement, to be implemented
through existing instruments and, where appropriate, 
by developing new ones. 
In particular, the paper sets eleven overarching
objectives for the EU: 1) creating a common zone of 
peace, prosperity and progress; 2) focussing on
relations with North Africa and the Middle East; 3)
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a strategic
priority; 4) a long-term and sustained engagement; 5) a 
strengthening of the EU’s political dialogue with the
region; 6) striving for respect for human rights and the 
rule of law; 7) promote action and co-operation on
terrorism, WMD and non-proliferation; 8) support
state’s and civil society efforts to pursue economic,
political and social reforms; 9) promote enhanced
security dialogue with the Mediterranean partners in
the framework of ESDP and in co-operation with
NATO; 10) modernisation of the regulatory
environment and liberalisation of trade; 11) co-
operation with the US, UN and other international
actors in the pursuit of these goals.
The first phase in developing the strategy (January-
March 2004) has seen discussions being pursued in
Council Working Groups (COMAG/COMEM), by
Political Directors, at the PSC, COREPER and
GAERC (23 February). The next phase will be mainly 
characterized by active consultation with partners in
the region to identify common objectives.
Italian Gen. Mosca Moschini appointed as second 
Chief of the EU Military Committee
The informal Defence Ministers’ meeting, in Brussels, 
on April 7, ended with a short ceremony in the
presence of the EU High Representative, Javier
Solana, to witness the hand over of the chairmanship
of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) from the
Finnish General Gustav Hägglund to the Italian
General Rolando Mosca Moschini. Since 2001, he had 
been serving as Italian Armed Forces Chief of
Defence. Throughout his career, he had also served as 
Military Attaché to the Italian Embassy in London and, 
as Military Advisor to the Italian Permanent Mission
to the United Nations, he was member of the Italian
Delegation to the Security Council.
Gen. Mosca Moschini was elected to the highest EU
military function on 7 may 2003, by the 15 members 
of the EUMC. Aware of taking over a busy and
ambitious agenda, which includes, just for this year, 
the creation of a EU planning cell, the decision over
the battle groups concept and the take-over of the
Bosnia mission form NATO, the new EUMC Chief 
pointed that his focus will be on concrete steps to take 
such projects forward. In this context, he considers 
Bosnia as an important test. Another major challenge 
will be, for the Italian General, to harmonize the
positions of the soon-to-be 25 members of the EUMC. 
With regard to relations with NATO, he affirmed that 
the guiding principles will continue to be a tight co-
operation and the non duplication of structures.
Possible EU’s peacekeeping mission to Sudan
In an interview with the Financial Times (April 13), 
the outgoing chairman of the EU’s Military
Committee, Gen. Hägglund, raised the prospect of the 
EU undertaking a peacekeeping mission in Sudan. In
2004, tensions in the western region of Darfur between 
the army and two rebel groups – the Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) – as well as between the rebel groups and the 
government-backed Arab militia, - the Janjaweed –
have been escalating, forcing some 800,000 people to 
internally displace or to flee to neighbouring Chad. For 
its spill-over effects, the conflict is now raising major 
concerns throughout the African continent and the
international community as a whole.
According to Gen. Hägglund, the possibility of the EU 
sending peacekeeping troops to Sudan had been raised 
by Louise Fréchette, the UN’s deputy secretary-
general. Such a mission would be mandated by the UN 
and would be part of the battle group concept
developed by France and the UK
